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Reevaluating Suspect Classifications 
Marcy Strauss∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State and federal governments inevitably classify and distinguish 
between individuals. Despite the promise of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause,1 the state rarely treats people equally, 
and the Clause does not require it to do so.2 The government must simply 
justify any legal distinction between individuals with a sufficient ratio-
nale.3 In most cases of unequal treatment under law, courts simply defer 
to the legislative judgment that the distinction is rational; only in certain 
unusual circumstances will the courts subject the government’s classifi-
cations to more rigorous examination.4 
This phenomenon is easily translated: courts employ different le-
vels of scrutiny depending on whether the discrimination affects a sus-
pect class.5 Discrimination among “nonsuspect” classifications receives 
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 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), the Supreme 
Court held that the requirement for equal protection of the laws applies to the federal government 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The analysis under the Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the equal protection guarantee via the Fifth 
Amendment is the same. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); see generally Kenneth Karst, The 
Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977). 
 2. “The guarantee of equal protection coexists, of course, with the reality that most legislation 
must classify for some purpose or another.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 995 
(N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 3. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 669 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 4. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 995. A similar phenomenon arises with respect to the Due Process 
Clause. Laws that infringe on, or discriminate with respect to, a fundamental right generally receive 
strict scrutiny, and laws that do not receive rational basis review. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374 (1978). 
 5. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215–21 (1982) (establishing that equal protection claims 
are evaluated according to three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate or heightened scruti-
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“rational basis scrutiny,” which is highly deferential to the legislative 
judgment.6 Those challenging such a law have the burden to establish 
that the law is not rationally related to any legitimate government pur-
pose.7 Although not all of these laws survive rational basis review, most 
do.8 Laws that facially discriminate against a “suspect class,” however, 
                                                                                                             
ny, and rational basis review). The choice between the three levels depends on the nature of the 
statute in question; if a suspect class is disadvantaged or a fundamental right impinged upon, the 
courts will employ strict scrutiny, and the statute will fail unless the government can demonstrate 
that the classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Id. at 
216–17. Of course, the Plyler model is somewhat simplistic because courts occasionally skip the 
step of deciding if a group is suspect or even what level of scrutiny it will employ. See, e.g., Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 
U.S. 752 (1973); see generally J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975). Moreover, as 
many scholars point out, claiming that there are three levels of scrutiny may be too simplistic; the 
Court employs more of a sliding-scale or nuanced approach. For example, many contend that the 
Court employs “rational basis plus” in cases like Romer, 517 U.S. at 620, Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and “strict 
scrutiny minus” in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944). Under any of these approaches, however, the Court attempts to justify the level of 
scrutiny primarily by considering the factors discussed in this Article. 
 6. Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper Methodology When Due 
Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 693 (2008) (explaining 
that the concept of rational basis review was established by Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)). Justice Marshall wrote, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. As Professor Rush explains, “[T]he concept of rational basis review—
the idea that all legislation at a minimum must be rationally related to a legitimate government pur-
pose—generally is not controversial. Minimum judicial review to evaluate the constitutionality of 
laws is consistent with preserving the supremacy of federal law, particularly the Constitution.” Rush, 
supra, at 693. 
 7. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“[T]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid 
and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.”); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New 
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
 8. For examples of laws that are struck down under rational basis review, see, e.g., Cleburne, 
473 U.S. at 432, and Moreno, 413 U.S. at 528. Rational basis review is so deferential that it has been 
called “minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.” Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search 
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1971). The Supreme Court has upheld over one hundred classifications under rational 
basis review since 1973 and invalidated about a dozen classifications. Suzanne Goldberg, Equality 
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 489 (2004); see also Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational 
Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 
357, 416–19 (1999). Rational basis review is deemed so minimal that academics and other observers 
of the Court often maintain that when a law is struck down under a purported rational basis test, the 
Court is not actually applying “true rational basis” review but rather is employing “rational basis 
with a bite.” See, e.g., Gunther, supra, at 19. For a general discussion of rational basis with a bite, 
see Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the 
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (2008). 
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are subject to “strict scrutiny.”9 Here, the government must demonstrate 
a compelling purpose for the distinction drawn and prove that such a 
classification is necessary to achieve that purpose.10 While some laws 
survive such rigorous scrutiny, most do not.11 Finally, laws that affect a 
“quasi-suspect class” receive intermediate scrutiny review.12 Such laws 
are upheld if the classification is substantially related to an important 
government purpose.13 Striking down laws under an intermediate level of 
scrutiny is difficult but not insurmountable.14 
                                                 
 9. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (The classifications race, alienage, or national origin “are so 
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such con-
siderations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy . . . . These laws are subjected to strict 
scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); 
Goldberg, supra note 8, at 496–98. 
 10. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause 
demands that racial classification be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, and if ever upheld, must be 
shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective). Two members of 
the Court stated that they “cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color 
of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.” McLaughlin v. Florida, 397 
U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
267, 274 (1986); Peter Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to 
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–26 (2000) (discussing the purpose 
of imposing strict scrutiny, which includes ensuring that the reviewing court does not allow the bias 
that may infect a legislative branch to affect its own decision). 
 11. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 8 (coining the famous phrase that strict scrutiny is “strict in 
theory and fatal in fact”); Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 948 n.15 (arguing that heightened scrutiny 
almost invariably results in the law being struck down); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in 
Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE 
L.J. 485, 488 (1998). Although the strict in theory, fatal in fact mantra has been renounced, at least 
in the context of affirmative action, see e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 
(1995), it remains an accurate assessment of the application of strict scrutiny. See Rubin, supra note 
10, at 4 (arguing that strict scrutiny so often leads to a finding of invalidity that it is not really a tool 
of analysis, as its name may suggest). For examples of laws surviving strict scrutiny, see Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Koremastu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 12. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (setting forth, for the first time, the concept 
of intermediate scrutiny for gender discrimination). Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court’s ap-
proach, accusing the majority of making up this level of scrutiny from thin air. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). To a large extent, all levels of scrutiny are susceptible to this criticism since they are 
all judicially created. 
 13. Id. at 197. 
 14. See, e.g., id. (striking down, under intermediate scrutiny, a law prohibiting males under 
twenty-one from drinking beer because the means were not substantially related to the ends); see 
also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a citizenship law that drew a distinction when 
the citizen–parent was a mother or father because there was an important purpose of preventing 
fraud and ensuring a relationship between child and citizen–parent); United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down a law under intermediate scrutiny because the government lacked an 
important reason for barring the admission of females to the Virginia Military Institute); Rostker v. 
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding, under intermediate scrutiny, a law limiting draft registra-
tion to only males because it was substantially related to an important government interest of ensur-
ing an orderly draft); Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a law 
punishing only males for statutory rape because of its sufficient relatedness to the important gov-
ernment interest of decreasing teenage pregnancy). The difference between “compelling” and “im-
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Since the outcome of an equal protection case is largely determined 
by whether the group is designated as a suspect, quasi-suspect, or non-
suspect class, one may assume that the test for distinguishing between 
the three types of classes has been carefully crafted and precisely de-
fined. But despite decades of case law on this specific issue, nothing 
could be further from the truth.15 The Supreme Court has not provided a 
coherent explanation for precisely what factors trigger heightened scruti-
ny. As one professor wrote, “[T]he Court uses a mixture of criteria to 
determine suspectness, creating an analytical muddle, and the boundary 
line between suspect classes and nonsuspect classes is drawn in a hapha-
zard way.”16 
Why is the law in such disarray? There is at least superficial con-
sensus for the basic premise of equal protection law: courts should be 
skeptical of—and should scrutinize more carefully—classifications in-
volving politically powerless groups that have historically been discrimi-
nated against.17 But beyond this basic truism, much is unsettled. What 
Professor Wilkinson said in 1975 remains true today: “[T]he law of sus-
pect classes is largely one of latent confusion . . . . The criteria of sus-
pectness have not been thoughtfully defined or consistently applied.”18 
This inconsistency is manifested in various ways. First, courts util-
ize various tests—what this Article will refer to as “factors”—to distin-
guish between suspect and nonsuspect classes.19 Different courts em-
                                                                                                             
portant” is also incredibly amorphous, but that problem lies predominantly beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 15. Professor (and now Fourth Circuit judge) Wilkinson made this point in 1975: “[T]he Court 
has not defined satisfactorily the elements of a suspect class.” Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 979. Over 
time, this ambiguity has not been clarified. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 10, at 16 (“The Supreme 
Court has never provided a comprehensive explanation of the concept of suspectness . . . .”); Cass 
Sunstein, What did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. 
REV. 27, 34 (2003) (“To say the least, the Court has not laid down a clear test for deciding when 
[strict] scrutiny will be applied” in equal protection cases.). 
 16. Thomas Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 141 
(1990). Of course, this argument proceeds under the assumption that the Court reasons from these 
factors to a conclusion. The factors are part of the “discovery” process—trying to determine the level 
of scrutiny—rather than just part of the justification. It could legitimately be argued, however, that 
the Court decides on the level of scrutiny and then uses these factors simply to justify its conclusion. 
 17. See infra notes 53, 55; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
105 (1973) (“Certain racial and ethnic groups have frequently been recognized as discrete and insu-
lar minorities who are relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political 
process . . . . Moreover, race, nationality or alienage is in most circumstances irrelevant to any con-
stitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.”). 
 18. Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 983; see also Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the 
Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 90 (1984) 
(arguing that the Court has never sufficiently explained the nexus between the factors that make a 
classification suspect and the need for both a stronger government interest and a tighter fit). 
 19. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding alienage as suspect only because 
it is a discrete and insular minority); Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a 
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phasize different factors without any real explanation why some are more 
important than others. For example, some courts are exclusively con-
cerned with the “discrete and insular” nature of the group, others focus 
on immutability of the group’s characteristics, and still others are mostly 
concerned with the group’s history of discrimination.20 
Yet, even if courts were to agree on which factors should be em-
phasized in equal protection cases, there remains significant uncertainty 
about the precise definition and measure of each factor. Even the most 
commonly utilized factors have no clearly established meaning. What 
exactly constitutes a discrete and insular minority? What does immuta-
bility require? How do we determine if a group is “politically power-
less”? Is it an absolute question or a relative one? If the latter, how much 
“powerlessness” is sufficient?21 Is powerlessness measured by the inabil-
ity to vote (so that minors under eighteen would be politically power-
less), or by the ability to be adequately protected by the political process 
(so that minors would likely not be politically powerless)?22 And even if 
the substantive definition of political powerlessness were universally 
defined, there remains the question of timing. Should powerlessness be 
measured from the date the law was passed (i.e., a law passed discrimi-
nating against women at a time when women could not vote), or at the 
time of the legal challenge? 
Moreover, even if courts agreed on which factors to consider and 
the meaning of each factor, they do not emphasize each factor uniformly. 
For example, it is unclear what factors or elements are necessary to a 
finding of suspectness, what are sufficient, or whether all elements must 
be satisfied.23 No readily definable test distinguishes between nonsuspect 
                                                                                                             
Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal 
Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18 (2005) (discussing the various factors); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Un-
explainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal 
Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 636 (2003) (“To obtain suspect class status, a 
group must demonstrate that it has suffered a history of discrimination, that it is politically power-
less, and that it faces discrimination on the basis of an immutable, obvious, or visible characteristic. 
Although all of these factors have appeared in cases discussing the standards for heightened scrutiny, 
courts . . . have often disregarded some or all of them in their analysis.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). All of these factors will be discussed in much more detail in Part III of this Article. 
 20. The differences among courts are discussed in detail later in this Article. See infra notes 53, 
55. 
 21. Rush, supra note 6, at 740. 
 22. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (finding that women are not a 
small and powerless minority but are vastly underrepresented in the nation’s decision-making coun-
cils). In Brown v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1984), the plaintiffs argued for heigh-
tened scrutiny for children because of their lack of political power, but the court rejected that level of 
scrutiny because of the absence of the other factors for suspect class status. 
 23. For example, the Supreme Court has expressed the factors in the disjunctive, suggesting 
that meeting any of them is sufficient to find a class is suspect. A suspect class entitled to strict scru-
tiny is one “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
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or suspect classification. Suspect classification presumably meets more 
of the elements, but it is unclear whether all, most, or merely some must 
be satisfied before a court will determine the class is suspect.24 
The ambiguity surrounding equal protection analysis produces in-
coherent results.25 Most would agree that the poor or the mentally infirm 
are groups that have suffered from political powerlessness and a history 
of discrimination. And most would agree that white males are not such a 
group. Yet, whites and males receive heightened scrutiny because race is 
a suspect class and gender is a quasi-suspect class, while the poor and 
disabled do not.26 
                                                                                                             
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (emphasis added). Other cases have emphasized other factors. See, e.g., Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (emphasizing relevancy of trait shared by 
group); Kerrigan v. Comm’r, 957 A.2d 407, 427 (Conn. 2008) (“[The] Supreme Court has placed far 
greater weight—indeed, it invariably has placed dispositive weight—on . . . whether the group has 
been the subject of long-standing and invidious discrimination and whether the group’s distinguish-
ing characteristics bears no relation to the ability of the group members to perform or function in 
society.”). For a general discussion of this principle, see Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 
F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that transsexuals are not a suspect class because they are not 
“necessarily” a discrete and insular minority and not shown to be immutable); Kari Balog, Equal 
Protection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutability Argument is Necessary and How it is Met, 53 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 551 (2005) (suggesting, without citation, that when all factors are shown, 
classification receives strict scrutiny); Althea Gregory, Denying Protection to those Most in Need: 
The FDA’s Unconstitutional Treatment of Children, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121, 136 (1997) (“A 
group seeking suspect class must demonstrate: (1) political powerlessness or minority status, (2) 
obvious, immutable or distinguishing characteristics delineating a discrete group, and (3) a history of 
discrimination.”); Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 635 (arguing that courts have often disregarded 
some or all of the factors in their analysis and the presence of some or even most of the factors have 
not necessarily resulted in heightened scrutiny); Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with 
Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classi-
fications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2775 (2005) (stating that irrelev-
ance of characteristic and history of discrimination are necessary and sufficient to finding suspect 
class and that other factors like immutability and political powerlessness are not essential but may 
“enhance” the finding of suspectness). 
 24. Rush, supra note 6, at 740; see, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 518 (1976) (The 
Court held that illegitimacy is entitled to heightened—though not strict—scrutiny. It emphasized 
immutability as a factor in favor of heightened scrutiny but ultimately did not find that strict scrutiny 
was justified in this case because the history of discrimination of illegitimate children was not as 
severe as discrimination based on race.). 
 25. Many have made this point, particularly with respect to the symmetrical treatment of laws 
involving any racial classification. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political 
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 752 (1991) (arguing that the Court’s affirmative action juri-
sprudence is “virtually impossible to justify on Carolene Products grounds”); Cristina M. Rodri-
guez, Latinos: Discrete and Insular No More, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 41, 44 n.16 (2009) (arguing 
that in consideration of racial minorities, “the discrete and insular formulation has been supplanted 
by the presumption that all racial classifications are invalid”). 
 26. Rush, supra note 6, at 740. More precisely, as will be discussed later, whites are part of a 
suspect classification—race—under the Court’s principle of symmetry; “once a subordinate class 
successfully establishes that the discrimination it faces warrants exacting judicial scrutiny, the Court 
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This Article explores the inconsistencies and absurdities of the tests 
used to establish a suspect classification for equal protection purposes. 
Although scholars have discussed the factors for distinguishing nonsus-
pect and suspect classes in the context of advocating a particular level of 
scrutiny for specific groups like homosexuals,27 children,28 the disabled,29 
and even felons,30 there has been little systematic evaluation of the crite-
ria without regard to a particular group. This Article attempts to provide 
that evaluation. It is primarily descriptive: the goal is to comprehensively 
and systematically expose the flaws, confusion, and unanswered ques-
tions that inure in the criteria for assessing suspect and nonsuspect 
classes. 
Despite the fact that the levels of scrutiny appear fairly established, 
this critique is important. First, appraising what the Court has done in its 
equal protection jurisprudence (i.e., applying strict scrutiny for race and 
rational basis for age) requires consideration of the underlying justifica-
tions for the levels of scrutiny. As mentioned previously, the determina-
tive question in equal protection analysis is what level of scrutiny to ap-
ply to a particular classification. Second, issues remain about what level 
of scrutiny to use in the future. The level of scrutiny for certain groups, 
most prominently sexual orientation, have not been determined. A ree-
valuation of the factors used to determine suspect classes is essential as 
the Court not only considers new groups31 but also potentially reconsid-
ers the level of scrutiny accorded to already established groups.32 Finally, 
                                                                                                             
applies heightened scrutiny symmetrically and extends judicial solicitude to any individual who 
encounters discrimination based on the ‘same’ trait as members of the subordinate class.” Hutchin-
son, supra note 19, at 638. As Professor Hutchinson wrote, “The application of heightened scrutiny 
to white plaintiffs is impossible to justify under the Carolene Products formulation.” Id. at 639. See 
also infra Part II. 
 27. See generally Balog, supra note 23; Rush, supra note 6; Smith, supra note 23; Sunstein, 
supra note 15. 
 28. See Brown v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Gregory, supra note 23. 
 29. See St. Louis Developmental Disabilities Treatment Ctr. Parents Ass’n v. Mallory, 591 F. 
Supp. 1416, 1471 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (declining to determine whether handicapped children are mem-
bers of a suspect class because it found that even if strict scrutiny were applied, the law would be 
upheld); Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The 
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a “Suspect Class” Under the Equal Protection Clause, 
15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 908 (1975) (arguing that individuals with handicaps are a suspect 
class). 
 30. See generally Aukerman, supra note 19. 
 31. There are almost an unlimited number of groups that could request the Court for suspect 
status. In California alone, requests have included licensed physicians, Griffiths v. Super. Ct. of Los 
Angeles Cnty., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 (Ct. App. 2002), dentists, Naismith Dental Corp. v. Bd. of 
Dental Exam’rs, 137 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 2005), and even lawyers, Russell v. Hug, 275 F.3d 
812, 819 (9th Cir. 2002). For all of these classifications, however, the courts rejected suspect status. 
 32. The Court, having received criticism for not awarding suspect status to certain groups, such 
as the mentally disabled and wealthy, could reevaluate the classification of those groups. Additional-
ly, as discussed further infra, even established groups might be subject to the Court’s reevaluation as 
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a restructuring of equal protection analysis requires a discussion about 
the standards for determining suspect and nonsuspect classes. Any debate 
over alternative approaches to equal protection analysis, such as whether 
the three-tiered approach of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and 
strict scrutiny should even exist, can proceed only after a review of the 
factors currently used by courts.33 
Accordingly, in Part II, I present a brief background on the devel-
opment of the equal protection doctrine’s relevant provisions, exploring 
where the idea of suspect classes originated and what factors the Court 
developed to determine such classes. Part III discusses and evaluates 
each factor, and analyzes the meaning—or lack thereof—of each element 
and how it has been used or misused in case law. In Part IV, I elaborate 
on possible solutions to the incoherency. 
II. SETTING THE STAGE: A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment de-
mands that no state shall deny any person equal protection of the laws.34 
Originally limited to protecting freed slaves,35 the Clause was deemed 
the “last resort of constitutional arguments” and hence rarely invoked in 
                                                                                                             
well. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the Court will reconsider the 
affirmative action program after twenty-five years). 
 33. This limited goal of initiating a discussion about critical constitutional issues is consistent 
with Carolene Products Footnote 4. See infra Part II. Professor Lusky, who clerked for Justice 
Stone, the author of the Carolene Products opinion, at the time of its drafting, suggested that the 
Footnote was not intended to be definitive or exhaustive: “[The Footnote] ‘did not purport to decide 
anything; it merely made some suggestions for future consideration.’ On its face, it did no more than 
identify questions . . . . The modest hope was that the Footnote would catalyze thoroughgoing analy-
sis and discussion by bar, bench, and academe, and that a complete and well-rounded doctrine would 
eventuate.” Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1098–99 (1982) (quoting Louis Lusky, Public Trial and Public Right: The Missing Bottom 
Line, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 305–06 (1980)); see also ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & HARLAN 
FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 513 (1956) (discussing how Justice Stone liked to use footnotes 
to start debates over ideas he had not fully developed in his own mind). 
 34. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 1868 to protect the rights of newly freed 
slaves. See generally JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201 (1965); Eric Schnapper, Affir-
mative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). 
Even prior to Carolene Products, however, the Court had extended the protection of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to races beyond freed slaves. Until the 1960s, the Equal Protection Clause had been 
applied only to racial classifications. 
 35. Early language suggested that the Equal Protection Clause would protect only freed slaves. 
The Slaughter-House Cases limited the scope of the Amendment to the freedom of the slave race, 
and to the security and protection of former slaves from those who had exercised dominion over 
them. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872). The Court’s focus on slave freedom is evident 
by its initial rejectment of the idea that gender could also be protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See generally Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875); see also BARBARA A. BABCOCK, ET 
AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1975). 
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its first fifty years.36 Indeed, equal protection claims were uncommon 
until revitalized during the Warren Court.37 
The notion that certain types of classifications warrant more rigor-
ous review than others under the Equal Protection Clause is often traced 
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal pronouncement in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.38 In the 1938 case involving a federal law ban-
ning filled milk, the Court decided whether a unitary, deferential stan-
dard for evaluating government action under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses was constitutionally re-
quired.39 In a famous footnote40—Footnote 4—Justice Stone suggested 
that “a more searching judicial inquiry” is warranted when prejudice 
against “discrete and insular minorities” undercuts the “operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”41 
                                                 
 36. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (describing the Equal Protection Clause as the “last 
resort of constitutional arguments”); see also Klarman, supra note 25, at 750 (describing how equal 
protection “emerged during the interwar period from a long hibernation”). 
 37. See Sherry, supra note 18. 
 38. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Professor Brilmayer described 
the case this way: “United States v. Carolene Products is no longer only a case. It is a line of reason-
ing, and one so venerable as to have achieved almost axiomatic status in a world where virtually 
every other proposition of constitutional law is best considered controversial.” Lea Brilmayer, Caro-
lene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the “Insider-Outsider,” 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1986). 
 39. The Carolene Products case came at a time of tremendous importance, for it marked the 
end of the Lochner era. During the Lochner period, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to a varie-
ty of economic legislation. By the 1930s, the Court switched gears and began to reaffirm traditional 
judicial deference to legislative choices on economic issues. Thus, the Carolene Products decision 
was handed down just as the Court was “beginning to dig itself out of the constitutional debris left 
by its wholesale capitulation to the New Deal a year before.” Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene 
Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713–14 (1985). In Footnote 4, the Court wanted to ensure that the 
rational basis standard utilized in the case to evaluate a law regulating filled milk was not deemed 
the only standard for constitutional adjudication. In a sense then, Footnote 4 “undertook to substitute 
one activist judicial mission for another.” Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1982). “Where once the Court had championed rights of property, 
now, according to some—it should view its special function as the identification and protection of 
‘discrete and insular minorities.’” Id. at 1089–90. 
 40. Footnote 4 has been universally called “the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.” 
Powell, supra note 39, at 1087; see also Ackerman, supra note 39, at 722–24; Brilmayer, supra note 
38, at 1294. 
 41. The Footnote actually had three paragraphs setting forth three distinct ideas. The first para-
graph evolved after a discussion between Justice Stone and Chief Justice Hughes and incorporates 
the Bill of Rights: “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionali-
ty when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced 
within the Fourteenth.” Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The second paragraph is concerned 
with legislation that restricts or impedes the political process and suggests that “more exacting” 
scrutiny is required in such circumstances. See Simon, supra note 16, at 123. The third paragraph is 
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The Footnote did not specify what precisely constituted such a mi-
nority (although the Court did refer to religious, racial, and ethnic minor-
ities),42 and it was unclear whether the political process must simply fail 
to protect discrete and insular minorities or whether an affirmative preju-
dice was necessary before such groups received special consideration. 
But the Court was clear in one respect: the Equal Protection Clause de-
manded more rigorous scrutiny of legislation when the political process 
could not be trusted. Justice Powell explained the meaning of the Foot-
note this way: 
The theory properly extracted from Footnote 4 . . . is roughly as fol-
lows: The fundamental character of our government is democratic. 
Our constitution assumes that majorities should rule and that the 
government should be able to govern. Therefore, for the most part, 
Congress, and the state legislatures should be allowed to do as they 
choose. But there are certain groups that cannot participate effec-
tively in the political process. And the political process therefore 
cannot be trusted to protect these groups in the way it protects most 
of us. Consistent with these premises, the theory continues, the Su-
preme Court has two special missions in our scheme of government: 
First to clear away impediments to participation, and to ensure that 
all groups can engage equally in the political process; and Second, 
to review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to discrete 
and insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves in the 
legislative process.43 
After Carolene Products, courts slowly began to develop a more 
elaborate framework for determining which groups deserved heightened 
scrutiny. Although the Court first referred to race as a suspect classifica-
tion in Korematsu v. United States,44 and then again in McLaughlin v. 
Florida,45 the Supreme Court did not articulate any real criteria for de-
termining suspectness until the early 1970s.46 For example, in the 1971 
                                                                                                             
the focus of this paper. See Lusky, supra note 33. For cases that use the discrete and insular criteria, 
see Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984), and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 42. In a lecture, Justice Powell suggested that limiting discrete and insular minorities to race, 
religion, and ethnicity would be a plausible reading of the Footnote. Powell, supra note 39, at 1089. 
 43. Id. at 1086–87. 
 44. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding that such legislation is 
subject “to the most rigid scrutiny”). Many scholars believe that although the Court purported to use 
strict scrutiny, the Court’s analysis was more like rational basis. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 25, at 
213–32. 
 45. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (striking down, under strict scrutiny, a state 
law that prohibited men and women of different races from living together). 
 46. Indeed, in Korematsu, the Court declared that laws that discriminate based on race are 
entitled to the most rigid scrutiny without any explanation at all. 323 U.S. at 214. Historical evidence 
has shown that the discussion of strict scrutiny in Korematsu was inserted late in the process, with-
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case Graham v. Richardson, the Court held, without any real elaboration, 
that “aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ mi-
nority for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”47 
Shortly thereafter, the Court began employing more concrete crite-
ria beyond reference to discrete and insular minorities. For example, in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme 
Court used the term “suspect class” for the first time,48 and most impor-
tantly, suggested some oft-quoted considerations for suspectness. In re-
jecting suspect class status for poor school districts, the Court noted that 
[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not sad-
dled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a positi on of politi-
cal powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process.49 
That same year—1973—the Supreme Court, in a case considering 
the suspectness of gender, set forth two more factors: whether a group’s 
defining characteristic was relevant to its ability to perform or contribute 
to society, and the immutability of that trait.50 The plurality found that a 
classification based on sex, for example, had no relevance to the ability 
to perform or contribute to society. Because sex is an “immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth,”51 the group deserved 
a quasi-suspect classification.52 
                                                                                                             
out any debate among the Justices. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 340 (1983); Rubin, supra 
note 10. 
 47. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The opinion provided no further expla-
nation for why aliens are a prime example of discrete and insular minorities. This was called an 
“amazing assertion” by Louis Lusky. Lusky, supra note 33, at 1105 n.72. See also Goldberg, supra 
note 8, at 485. 
 48. Reginold Oh, A Critical Linguistic Analysis of Equal Protection Doctrine: Are Whites a 
Suspect Class?, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 583, 594 (2004). 
 49. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). This case involved 
members of minority groups and the poor who challenged the Texas school finance system, arguing 
that it was unconstitutional because it collected its money through local property taxation and there-
fore created a disparity in the level of education that was proportional to the wealth of the neighbor-
hood and its residents. Id. at 18. But the Court found that the Texas school finance system was con-
stitutional because the poor are not a suspect class, and since the opportunity to receive an education 
remained, the fundamental right to education had not been infringed upon. Id. at 28–29. The Court 
applied rational basis review, and Texas satisfied a showing of a rational relation to a legitimate state 
purpose. Id. at 38–39. In my review of lower court cases, this quote came up most often as the defi-
nition of suspect class. 
 50. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Only four Justices agreed on the appro-
priateness of strict scrutiny for gender. Shortly thereafter, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976), a majority settled on intermediate scrutiny review for gender classifications. 
 51. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
 52. Id. 
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Thus, although described in different ways, the basic factors for de-
termining suspect class status were in place by the early 1980s: (1) pre-
judice against a discrete and insular minority; (2) history of discrimina-
tion against the group; (3) the ability of the group to seek political re-
dress (i.e., political powerlessness); (4) the immutability of the group’s 
defining trait; and (5) the relevancy of that trait. Using some combination 
of these factors, the Court has deemed various groups suspect, others 
quasi-suspect, and still others nonsuspect since the 1970s. Facial classifi-
cations based on race, national origin, and religion are considered suspect 
and receive strict scrutiny.53 Gender and illegitimacy are considered qua-
si-suspect and receive intermediate scrutiny.54 Age, socioeconomic sta-
tus, and mental disability are subject to rational basis review.55 All other 
classifications (such as sexual orientation)56 either have not been decided 
or are reviewed under the default rational basis standard.57 
                                                 
 53. See generally Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (discussing race); Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (discussing national origin/alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (discussing 
race). Facially neutral classifications that have a discriminatory impact but do not have a discrimina-
tory purpose, however, only receive rational basis review. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976). 
 54. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding 
that illegitimacy received intermediate scrutiny); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677 (plurality recognizing 
gender as a suspect class). Later in Craig, the Court held that gender is more appropriately described 
as a quasi-suspect class. 429 U.S. at 197. 
 55. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc, 473 U.S. 432, 440–42, 447 (1985) 
(discussing the mentally disabled); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (discuss-
ing age); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20, 25 (1973) (discussing socioe-
conomic status). Of course, many argue that while the Court claims to be applying rational basis 
review, it is actually imposing some “bite” into the process. For example, Professor Ronald Krotos-
zyniski suggests that in cases like Romer, Cleburne, and Plyler where the Court purported to apply 
rational basis review, it actually required the government to “offer the actual reason for the enact-
ment and to establish that the government purpose was actually advanced by the application of the 
law on the facts presented.” Krotoszynski, supra note 8, at 1264–65; see also Sunstein, supra note 
15, at 59–61. 
 56. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, the Supreme Court held that Colora-
do’s Proposition 2, which facially discriminated against homosexuals, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause using rational basis review. Id. The Court, however, never discussed the factors described 
here nor held that sexual orientation was not a suspect class. Additionally, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003), when Justice O’Connor analyzed the Texas law prohibiting sodomy under the 
Equal Protection Clause, she utilized a rational basis standard of review. While the lower courts have 
employed mostly rational basis review, the Obama Administration has recently issued a statement 
that it believes that heightened scrutiny is appropriate: “After careful consideration the President has 
concluded that given a number of factors, including a documented history of discrimination, classifi-
cations based on sexual orientation should be subject to a more heightened standard of scrutiny.” 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the 
Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/ 
11-ag-222.html. 
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III. WHAT MAKES A CLASSIFICATION “SUSPECT”? THE INHERENT 
AMBIGUITY AND UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY FACTORS 
The suspectness of a group, and the level of scrutiny accorded to it, 
is almost always critical to the outcome of an equal protection case. Al-
most no law survives strict scrutiny; virtually nothing fails rational basis 
review. The designation of a group as suspect or nonsuspect is the penul-
timate question in determining if a law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Yet, as I argue in this part, the criterion for determining a group’s 
suspectness is anything but clear. As Professor Wilkinson colorfully 
stated, “[T]he suspect class is . . . an unruly horse which the Court refus-
es to tame.”58 Even the Court itself has conceded that the formula for 
determining suspect status suffers from lack of specificity. In Plyler v. 
Doe, the Court noted that “[s]everal formulations might explain our 
treatment of certain classifications as ‘suspect’”59 and then tentatively 
listed several factors.60 
Though oft-repeated, the factors by which to measure suspectness 
are not adequately defined. Many are duplicative and inconsistent, and 
all are amorphous. Further, it is not clear whether a suspect class must 
meet all of them, most of them, or just some of them. After over fifty 
years of employing these factors, significant questions still remain about 
the meaning of the factors for determining one of the most important 
questions in constitutional law: whether and when a legislative judgment 
involving equal protection of the law should be rigorously scrutinized by 
a court. 
This Part describes the various factors and discusses the unans-
wered questions about their meaning. Specifically, I consider three is-
sues: (1) the ambiguity about the meaning of each factor; (2) the ambigu-
ity about how the factors interrelate; and (3) the problem of symmetry. 
                                                                                                             
 57. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3; see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating a food stamp regulation that distinguished between related and nonre-
lated members of a household under rational basis review).  
 58. Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 983. 
 59. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 60. As the Court explained, 
Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice . . . . 
Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goals . . . . 
Finally, certain groups, indeed, largely the same groups have historically been relegated 
to . . . a position of political powerlessness . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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A. Applying the Factors: Ambiguity and Questions Within  
the Established Criteria 
This section explores the criteria commonly identified in case law.  
I argue that even the presumably well-established factors are unclearly 
and even inconsistently applied by courts. Moreover, it is not always 
clear how the factors relate to the underlying goal identified in Carolene 
Products of employing judicial scrutiny when the legislative process 
cannot be trusted. 
1. Discrete and Insular Minorities 
The most famous factor is the original from Carolene Products 
Footnote 4: courts must apply heightened scrutiny to laws that burden a 
discrete and insular minority.61 Specifically, Justice Stone wrote that 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion . . . curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes ordinarily 
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [so] may call for a correspon-
dingly more searching judicial inquiry.”62 This factor, perhaps more than 
any other, has received the most thorough academic discussion and criti-
cism.63 
On an abstract level, the idea of protecting discrete and insular mi-
norities under the Equal Protection Clause has intuitive appeal.64 In prac-
tice, however, this factor raises significant questions.65 First, there is no 
commonly accepted definition of the terms “discrete” and “insular.”66 In 
                                                 
 61. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also Brown v. 
Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (explaining the identification of a suspect classifica-
tion simply by repeating Justice Stone’s phrase, “protecting discrete and insular minorities”). Ironi-
cally, this is likely the least-used factor today. 
 62. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
 63. See supra notes 31, 37–39. At one point, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern about the 
validity of the discrete and insular criteria to determine suspectness, reasoning that there would be so 
many groups qualifying as a suspect class that the Equal Protection Clause could become unworka-
ble: “[American] society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous origins, cus-
toms, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly take extraordinary 
ingenuity for a lawyer to find ‘insular and discrete’ minorities at every turn in the road.” Sugarman 
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As it turns out, this concern was 
unwarranted. Today, very few groups are subject to heightened scrutiny, and the Court has failed to 
categorize any class as suspect since the 1970s. 
 64. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 981 (A court’s act of designating groups as “discrete 
and insular has so far been more a matter of feel on the part of the court than of any rationally justi-
fiable process. The label is more emotive than analytical.”). Cf. Lusky, supra note 33, at 1105 (ar-
guing that legal scholars have attributed meaning to the terms “discrete” and “insular” that are not 
found in any dictionary or have “any foundation in the Footnote’s language or in the thinking that 
engendered it”). 
 65. Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 981. 
 66. Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 1235 
(2003). 
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early cases, courts often conclusorily asserted that a particular group was 
or was not a discrete and insular minority.67 It is also unclear precisely 
what must be established in order for a court to consider a group discrete 
and insular. Must a group be discrete and insular and a minority and ex-
periencing “prejudice”? Moreover, how is prejudice measured or deter-
mined? 
Academics have attempted to fill in the gaps left by the courts.  
Perhaps the most widely accepted explanation for the terms “discrete and 
insular minority” is that suggested by Professor Bruce Ackerman. Pro-
fessor Ackerman equated discreteness with visibility: A group is discrete 
if they are visible in a way that makes them “relatively easy for others to 
identify.”68 A group is insular if they tend to interact with each other with 
“great frequency in a variety of social contexts.”69 
Yet, it is unclear why these traits, as so defined, translate into a jus-
tification for heightened judicial scrutiny. One assumption may be that 
discrete and insular minorities need heightened scrutiny because they 
cannot rely on the political process to protect their interests. But such 
reasoning is superficial at best. Indeed, as Professor Ackerman describes, 
a group’s discreteness and insularity may allow for some degree of polit-
ical power. Discrete and insular minority groups are able to form coali-
tions that are politically influential. In other words, a group’s visibility 
(discreteness) and its cohesiveness and group identity (insularity) make it 
more likely to become a cohesive, powerful minority force to be reck-
oned with. Conversely, diffuse groups that lack a clear identity may not 
have a similarly strong political voice.70 As Professor Ackerman wrote, 
Other things being equal, ‘discreteness and insularity’ will normally 
be a source of enormous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, 
for a group engaged in pluralist American politics. Except for spe-
cial cases, the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to 
protect groups that possess the opposite characteristics from the one 
Carolene emphasizes—groups that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ ra-
ther than ‘discrete and insular.’ It is these groups that both political 
science and American history indicate are systematically disadvan-
taged in a pluralist democracy.71 
                                                 
 67. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (concluding, without any other explanation, that transsexuals 
are not “necessarily” a discrete and insular minority). 
 68. Ackerman, supra note 39, at 729. 
 69. Id. at 726. 
 70. For example, it has been argued that indigents are invisible, Wilkerson, supra note 5, as are 
many alcoholics and homosexuals who remain in the closet, Yoshino, supra note 11. 
 71. See Ackerman, supra note 39, at 723–24. 
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The critique by Ackerman and others affirms that the phrase “dis-
crete and insular minority” needs further clarification, refocus, and revi-
sion. Justice Stone in Carolene Products invoked the phrase to identify 
groups for whom the political process would not work, but the words 
“discrete” and “insular” were not instructive. Thus, courts began to use 
other factors, such as a group’s political power, history of discrimination, 
and immutability, to determine whether the group was indeed a discrete 
and insular minority.72 Accordingly, courts today measure suspectness by 
these more specific factors, discussed below, to implement the theory 
behind Footnote 4 of Carolene Products rather than by attempting to de-
fine the phrase “discrete and insular.” 
2. History of Discrimination 
An additional factor used by courts is a group’s history of discrimi-
nation.73 This factor is separate from (but often related to) whether the 
group is a statistical minority because even a numerically strong group 
may have suffered from discrimination.74 Considering the group’s history 
of discrimination raises two questions: its relevance (i.e., why is discrim-
ination history used to determine suspectness?); and its meaning (i.e., 
how do we determine when a group has truly experienced discrimina-
tion?). 
A history of discrimination is relevant to a group’s suspect status 
because it is connected to the group’s political power and indicates 
whether the legislative process has failed to protect it, warranting judicial 
intervention. Thus, some courts or commentators consider the history of 
discrimination factor to be a subset of the political powerlessness criteria 
rather than its own separate and distinct criterion. 
                                                 
 72. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 66, at 1235 (describing the criteria as factors to determine if 
a group is a discrete and insular minority deserving the protection of heightened scrutiny); Michael 
Scaperlanda, Illusions of Liberty and Equality: An “Alien’s” View of Tiered Scrutiny, Ad Hoc Ba-
lancing, Governmental Power, and Judicial Imperialism, 55 CATH. U. L. REV 5, 26 (2005) (explain-
ing that to determine if a minority was discrete and insular, the Court would consider history of 
discrimination, political powerlessness, and immutability of the group’s defining characteristic). 
Many see the immutability requirement as an implementation of the “visibility” element. See, e.g., 
Yoshino, supra note 11, at 565. 
 73. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (finding that close relatives excluded 
from food stamps have not been subjected to discrimination); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 
473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (finding that the mentally disabled are not subject to continuing antipathy 
or prejudice); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (finding that the aged generally 
do not experience a history of purposeful unequal treatment). 
 74. Scaperlanda, supra note 72, at 26–27 (The theory that women, who comprise a majority of 
the population, are so politically powerless that they require the judiciary’s protection is weak. Yet, 
they are a group that has suffered a history of discrimination.). 
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A group’s history of discrimination might have affected the group’s 
relationship to the political process in two ways. First, because of this 
history, a group may be unable to form coalitions with other groups, 
which may be necessary to garner effective political power.75 Other poss-
ible allies may share discriminatory views toward this group. Second, 
legislators may be susceptible to prejudice toward the group as well. 
Legislators are not always immune from the public biases that have re-
sulted from a history of discrimination against the group. In other words, 
a history of discrimination can determine whether a bias exists in the leg-
islature (which can otherwise be difficult to ascertain) and whether it ne-
cessitates judicial scrutiny. As Professor Ackerman wrote, 
While no group can expect to win every time in a democratic sys-
tem, we all expect our lawmakers to consider our arguments with 
respect and to reject them only when they are inconsistent with the 
public interest. If a group fails to receive this treatment, it suffers a 
special wrong, one quite distinct from its substantive treatment on 
the merits.76 
The accuracy of these assumptions is hampered by the inherent am-
biguity in what exactly constitutes a true history of discrimination. What 
does a “history of discrimination” mean? How do we determine if a 
group has experienced the requisite history of discrimination? As Profes-
sor Wilkinson noted, “The Court has not . . . defined what quantum, kind 
or how recent past discrimination is required.”77 Nor has the Court clari-
fied the requisite historical period. In other words, how much time is ne-
cessary to establish a history of discrimination? What happens when a 
relatively new group with minimal history seeks suspect status (e.g., 
transgendered individuals)? As Professor Sharona Hoffman noted, “[I]t 
is not clear when evidence becomes historical . . . . For example, is dis-
crimination against those with HIV historical or contemporary, given that 
it began only after the disease was first identified in 1981?”78 
Because of the lack of precise guidance in determining whether a 
group has the requisite history of discrimination, courts often decide dis-
criminatory history by comparing the experience of the group to that of 
African-Americans or women.79 Presumably, if a history is not analogous 
                                                 
 75. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 507. 
 76. Ackerman, supra note 39, at 738. 
 77. Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 981. 
 78. Hoffman, supra note 66, at 1255 n.242 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. See Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980) (holding that similar to the 
discrimination against female service workers in Frontiero, male widowers were discriminated 
against by a Missouri statute that gave death benefits only to widows); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 
495, 506 (1976) (finding that the history of discrimination experienced by illegitimate children was 
less severe than that suffered by women or blacks “perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not 
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to that of either African-Americans or women—the former a suspect 
class and the latter a quasi-suspect class—the group is probably nonsus-
pect. 
The courts’ use of this analogy begs the question: Which part of a 
group’s historical experience must mirror that of women or of African-
Americans in order to be worthy of suspect status? For example, the 
LGBT community, like the African-American community, has been sub-
jected to a history of physical violence.80 On the other hand, LGBTs have 
never been enslaved, as have African-Americans, and, because sexual 
orientation is often hidden, have not been subject to employment dis-
crimination in nearly the same degree. But long after African-Americans 
could freely marry and serve in the military, the LGBT community con-
tinues to experience discrimination in those realms. How should a court 
analyze such similarities and differences? Without more guidance, 
judges are free to indulge their own stereotypes and biases about a par-
ticular group, which is the precise reason the group seeks refuge from the 
legislative process. 
The analogy also seems inherently unfair and restrictive. No 
group’s history is truly analogous to that of African-Americans. If sla-
very is a requisite factor in determining that a group has truly suffered 
from discrimination, suspect status will be difficult—if not impossible—
for others to obtain. The historical experiences of women lacked the for-
mal bonds of slavery but share many similar discriminatory experiences 
with African-Americans. So if quasi-suspect status is reserved for groups 
whose history is “analogous to women,” what precisely does that entail? 
One may argue that Hispanics and Asians, who have never been en-
slaved nor suffered the exact deprivations as African-Americans, are still 
categorized as suspect, which proves that courts do not require the analo-
gy to be precise. But a law that discriminates against Hispanics, Asians, 
or Caucasians receives strict scrutiny because the Court treats all facial 
racial classifications the same, without regard to history of discrimina-
tion. The discrimination history of racial groups does not illustrate how a 
court would assess a new nonracial group. Moreover, the discrimination 
of any group in comparison to that of African-Americans will fall short 
of 100 years of enslavement followed by years of segregation and Jim 
                                                                                                             
carry an obvious badge”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (hold-
ing that poverty is not a suspect classification because it lacks the “traditional indicia of suspectness” 
that is apparent in established suspect classes, such as race and gender). 
 80. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008 HATE CRIME STATISTICS 
(Nov. 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2008 (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). 
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Crow laws. The courts have never adequately explained how we com-
pare that history to that of the poor, LGBTs, or any other group. 
Besides the analogy’s lack of clarity, there is also a concern that it 
may cause some groups to mischaracterize or downplay the discrimina-
tion of another minority in order to describe themselves as similarly vic-
timized. A legal approach that encourages minimizing another group’s 
suffering is misguided and unwise. 
3. Political Powerlessness 
Political powerlessness refers to a group’s inability to rely on the 
legislative process to protect its interests.81 In many ways, the issue of 
political power overlaps with the earlier criteria: it is the reason we care 
about a group’s history of discrimination or whether the group is a dis-
crete and insular minority. Thus, some courts consider political power-
lessness to be the ultimate question and view the other factors as subis-
sues. Whether viewed as the penultimate issue or simply one factor 
among several,82 the idea behind political powerlessness is the same—
the courts must protect groups that are vulnerable to legislative bias.83 
Courts do not employ a consistent approach in measuring political 
powerlessness,84 and the Supreme Court provides little guidance. “[I]n 
                                                 
 81. See Rush, supra note 6, at 713–14 (calling political powerlessness a “major” criteria the 
Court uses to classify groups as suspect). 
 82. Several lower courts have taken the position that political powerlessness is actually one of 
the least significant factors or even irrelevant. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r, 957 A.2d 407, 429 
(Conn. 2008) (arguing the Court has, and should, accord political powerlessness little weight); see 
also Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437–38 n.17 (S.D. 
Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) 
(“[T]he significance of [the political powerlessness factor] pales in comparison to the question[s] of 
whether . . . the characteristic bears any relationship to the individual[’]s ability to function in socie-
ty, whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination based on misconceptions of that fac-
tor[,] and whether that factor is the product of the group’s own volition.”). But see the comments of 
Justice Borden, dissenting in Kerrigan, where he argues that political power of the group seeking 
heightened scrutiny is a highly relevant consideration that relates to the central thesis of Carolene 
Products: “Although the United States Supreme Court has not always cited the Carolene Products 
Co. footnote in its formulation of the test for heightened scrutiny, it has applied the political power 
factor in determining whether legislation affecting a particular class is to be made subject to that 
scrutiny.” Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 491 (Borden, J., dissenting). 
 83. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (finding that although the position 
of women has improved, they still face pervasive, although conspicuous, discrimination in the politi-
cal arena). 
 84. See id.; see also Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506 (“[I]llegitimacy does not carry an obvious 
badge, as race or sex do, [and] this discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the 
severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against women and Ne-
groes.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 37 (finding that children still have “an opportu-
nity to acquire the basic minimum skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of free speech and 
full participation in the political process”); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 429 (finding that this factor “is not 
readily discernible by reference to objective standards . . . and [is] not readily susceptible to judicial 
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most cases [the Court] has no more than made passing reference to the 
political power factor without actually analyzing it.”85 
Judges and scholars have suggested four possible approaches, used 
either separately or in combination, to assess power. These approaches 
consider (1) the group’s ability to vote; (2) the pure numbers of the 
group; (3) the existence of favorable legislative enactments that might 
demonstrate political power; and (4) whether members of the group have 
achieved positions of power and authority. 
First, courts consider a group’s ability—or more precisely, inabili-
ty—to vote. A group lacking the power to vote is a quintessential politi-
cally powerless group. So, for example, children,86 aliens,87 or even ex-
felons88 would satisfy this condition. But even here, a seemingly clear-
cut criterion is not necessarily so. Should a court measure a group’s ina-
bility to vote at the time the law was passed or at the time of challenge?  
This problem can be illustrated by a law passed in 1901 but challenged in 
1970. Women did not have the power to vote in 1901, but at the time of 
the lawsuit, they had more than fifty years to seek redress and to alter 
that law in the political process.89 Should a court find women politically 
powerless because they lacked the right to vote in 1901? Or does the fact 
that they had the power to vote when the lawsuit was filed render that 
conclusion irrelevant when placed in a larger context? 
Moreover, the inability to vote may be sufficient for a finding of 
political powerlessness, but it is not necessary. The right to vote “does 
not cure a condition of political powerlessness, for blacks, women, indi-
gents, and illegitimates may all vote, and yet all are politically power-
less.”90 Political powerlessness must mean something other than simply 
an inability to vote. A minority group may still be unable to garner 
enough votes to protect themselves in the political process, even if they 
can vote. 
The problem with using the right to vote as a proxy for political 
power leads to the second approach used by the courts: political power-
                                                                                                             
fact-finding”); Yoshino, supra note 11, at 565 (The standards for political powerlessness are applied 
inconsistently across contexts.). 
 85. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440–41. 
 86. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 36. 
 87. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (holding that aliens receive strict scrutiny 
because they “have no direct voice in the political process”). 
 88. Aukerman, supra note 19, at 55. 
 89. Women received the right to vote in 1920 with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 90. Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 981. Judge Wilkinson made this point in 1975, and while some 
may now question the conclusion, the basic point remains valid. 
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lessness measured simply by the pure numerical power of the group.91  
Using this approach, a court asks simply if the group seeking heightened 
scrutiny is a minority.92 This approach, however, equates the political 
powerlessness factor with the Carolene Products discrete and insular 
minority test, and is subject to identical ambiguities about the true defini-
tion of “minority.” Political science theorists have consistently rejected 
the notion that being a minority renders a group powerless in the political 
arena simply by virtue of its numbers.93 
Additionally, determining powerlessness by looking solely at popu-
lation numbers could indicate that a group’s suspectness would vary de-
pending on the particular law challenged, an approach no court has en-
dorsed. For example, some have argued that homosexuals, a group with a 
4% or 5% national population, are numerically significant in other con-
texts, such as large cities.94 Such a group would be considered suspect in 
one locality and not another, and the challenged law might be struck 
down in one community and upheld in another.95 For obvious reasons, 
this would create an equal protection nightmare.96 
Using a group’s population percentage to measure its political po-
werlessness would also be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s award-
ing gender quasi-suspect status. At the time of that decision, women 
were a statistical majority of the voting population,97 yet the Court still 
suggested that women were politically powerless when it held that classi-
fications based on gender must receive heightened scrutiny. 
                                                 
 91. See, for example, the comments of the Washington State Supreme Court, where the court 
said that to qualify as a suspect class, “the class must have suffered a history of discrimination, have 
as the characteristic defining the class an obvious, immutable trait that frequently bears no relation to 
ability to perform or contribute to society and show that it is a minority or politically powerless 
class.” Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (emphasis added). The use of the 
word “or” seems to indicate that being a minority or being politically powerless is interchangeable. 
 92. This was one of the elements of political power discussed in the lengthy hearing held in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 93. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 39. 
 94. Erik Ludwig, Protecting Laws Designed to Remedy Anti-Gay Discrimination from Equal 
Protection Challenges: The Desirability of Rational Basis Scrutiny, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 513, 553 
(2006). 
 95. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Terry, J., 
concurring) (“[F]or purposes of evaluating constitutional norms, the focus on political power, or 
powerlessness, has to be national, not local, lest constitutional rights vary from city to city.”). 
 96. Additionally, it would create the horror Justice Marshall mentioned in Croson whereby a 
group might have to choose between suspect status and strict scrutiny and numerical supremacy and 
power. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 554 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 97. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r, 957 A.2d 407, 456 (Conn. 2008) (discussing that, in 1970, census 
data revealed that there were approximately seventy million women of voting age and approximately 
sixty-three million men). 
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Third, political power could be measured by the existence of laws 
that are favorable toward the group in question.98 This reasoning is simi-
lar to the torts doctrine of res ipsa loquiter, or the idea that “the action 
speaks for itself.” If laws favorable towards a particular group have been 
enacted, that group obviously has political influence. Justice White em-
ployed this type of logic in Cleburne when he determined that the men-
tally disabled were not a politically powerless group.99 After surveying 
the various state and federal laws that responded to the plight of the men-
tally handicapped, the Court concluded: “[T]he legislative response, 
which could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, 
negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in 
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmak-
ers.”100 
More recently, lower courts have made a similar point with respect 
to sexual orientation discrimination. For example, the Ninth Circuit held 
that gays and lesbians failed to demonstrate that they were politically 
powerless because “legislatures have addressed and continue to address 
the discrimination suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual 
orientation through the passage of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, 
homosexuals are not without political power; they have the ability to at-
tract the attention of lawmakers as evidenced by such legislation.”101 
The res ipsa loquiter method for measuring political power is prob-
lematic on a number of levels. First, it is too simplistic. The fact that oth-
er laws may be beneficial to a particular group does not mean that the 
particular law in question does not violate the group’s right to equal pro-
tection.102 A group can be both politically powerless and have some leg-
islation passed on its behalf. This is particularly true in our system of 
federalism. For example, if a group challenges a discriminatory state or 
local law, should the existence of federal legislation demonstrate political 
power? The existence of a federal law says little about laws at a local 
                                                 
 98. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); High Tech Gays v. Def. 
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); St. Louis Developmental Disabilities 
Treatment Ctr. Parents Ass’n v. Mallory, 591 F. Supp. 1416, 1471 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (pointing to 
passage of the Rehabilitation and the Education Act as “detracting” from any political powerless 
concern for the handicapped). 
 99. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445. 
 100. Id. 
 101. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574; see also Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 975 
(Wash. 2006) (“The enactment of provisions providing increased protection to gay and lesbian indi-
viduals . . . shows that [they] are not powerless but, instead, exercise increasing political power . . . . 
[The] plaintiffs have not shown that they satisfy the third prong of the suspect classification test.”). 
 102. James Ellis, On the Usefulness of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 379–
80 (1986); see also Rush, supra note 6, at 713 (calling the inference that because a group has some 
favorable legislation, the group is not the target of prejudice or hostility a “huge leap”). 
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level. Yet, that presumption is one the Court indulges. In Cleburne, the 
Court pointed to a variety of congressional enactments protecting the 
mentally disabled to justify its conclusion that the group possessed polit-
ical power when evaluating a local zoning law.103 
This method of measuring political power seems naïve. Under this 
analysis, even African-Americans would not be considered “politically 
powerless” in light of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1868, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Similarly, 
women benefited from Title X and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. “If pursued to its logical end, this inquiry could actually support 
removal of traits such as race and sex from the list of suspect classifica-
tions.”104 
The assumption that the existence of beneficial laws equates to in-
herent political power ignores the myriad of contexts in which legislation 
is passed.105 It also ignores the complicated relationship between courts 
and legislatures. For example, a legislature could pass a palliative, sym-
bolic, or mostly ineffective law with respect to a minority with the intent 
of preventing real change for that group. Or a legislature could pass a law 
in response to, or in anticipation of, a judicial order.106 Under an ap-
proach that merely looks to the existence of such a law rather than its 
substance, that law would indicate that a group has sufficient political 
power, negating the need for any heightened judicial scrutiny. 
Professor Segura has suggested a number of variables that would 
need to be considered before concluding that favorable legislation is a 
reliable measure of political power, including whether the laws were ju-
dicially triggered, whether they were passed with bipartisan majorities or 
by slim majorities, and the nature of the law itself.107 But courts rarely 
                                                 
 103. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445. 
 104. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 504–05. The Connecticut Supreme Court made this point as 
well and concluded that political powerlessness cannot be judged by the mere existence of favorable 
legislation. Kerrigan v. Comm’r 957 A.2d 407, 440–41 (Conn. 2008). Rather, the court found the 
relevant question to be whether the discrimination suffered by the group has been so severe that even 
despite favorable legislation, the group still requires the judicial protection. Id. at 442–43. The court 
suggested that the question should be a comparative one: in the case of gays and lesbians, the rele-
vant question would be whether the group has the same amount of political power as women did in 
the 1970s. Id. at 444. 
 105. In his testimony, Professor Segura explains federal hate crime law as an example. In order 
to get it passed, the Democrats had to attach it as a rider to the Defense Authorization Bill. This 
practice essentially involves attaching a controversial piece of legislation (the Hate Crime Law) to a 
law with widespread support (the Defense Authorization Bill). Even then, 75% of the Republican 
senators voted against the Defense Authorization Bill, an unusual position for Republicans. Tran-
script of Record at 1541–42, Perry v. Schwarzenneger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 
09-2292-VRW). 
 106. Id. at 1549. 
 107. Id. at 1539. 
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engage in the elaborate analysis that Segura suggests is necessary to 
make a reliable finding of political power based on favorable legisla-
tion.108 
Besides being too simplistic, the theory also provides no way of re-
conciling the very common situation when both favorable and unfavora-
ble legislation exists. For example, while there are many laws beneficial 
to the LGBT community, particularly in the area of employment rights, 
there are also many laws demonstrating antipathy toward the group, par-
ticularly in the realm of family rights.109 A court that focuses on one set 
of laws might be inclined to find a group politically powerful; another 
court more concerned with the family law restrictions might well reach 
the opposite conclusion.110 
Finally, it is not always clear whether a law is truly beneficial to-
ward a group, particularly without context and perhaps the perspective of 
time.  For example, laws requiring that blacks and whites travel on sepa-
rate railroad cars was argued—and accepted by the Court at the time—to 
be “beneficial” for blacks because it would help ensure peaceful relation-
ships between the races.111 The difficulty of determining whether legisla-
tion truly benefits a group is parallel to the difficulty of determining 
whether a law is benign or invidious in the affirmative action context.112 
Because of all of these problems, it is unsurprising that the Court 
has been inconsistent in how it uses the existence of favorable legislation 
to determine a group’s political power. While the Court in Cleburne held 
that rational basis review was justified since the legislative response to 
the mentally disabled “negates any claim that the mentally retarded are 
politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the 
attention of the lawmakers,”113 the Court in Frontiero used the existence 
of laws against sex discrimination to reach precisely the opposite conclu-
sion. There, the plurality reasoned that heightened scrutiny in gender 
cases was justified in part because of such legislation: 
[O]ver the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing 
sensitivity to sex-based classification . . . . Thus, Congress itself has 
concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invi-
dious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not 
                                                 
 108. One exception is the district court’s approach in Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 921. 
 109. One obvious example is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines marriage 
as between a man and a woman. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
 110. See, e.g., Rush, supra note 6, at 722–34.  
 111. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 112. See, for example, comments by Justice Thomas in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200 (1995). 
 113. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985). 
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without significance to the question presently under considera-
tion.114 
The fact that favorable legislation can support one proposition (the 
existence of political power justifying courts’ reluctance to intrude on the 
political process), as well as its opposite (political powerlessness and 
suffering by a group requiring court intervention on behalf of that group), 
suggests that political power is not accurately determined by the exis-
tence of such laws. Courts should consider legislation only after receiv-
ing testimony about the complex political and social construct behind 
such a law. 
Besides considering a group’s ability to vote, its numerical power, 
or the existence of favorable legislation, some courts have attempted to 
measure political powerlessness by looking at whether members of the 
group have achieved positions of power and authority. A plurality of the 
Court in Frontiero attributed women’s political powerlessness to the lack 
of women holding political office. In a footnote, Justice Brennan noted 
that while women were not a small and powerless minority, they are 
vastly underrepresented in this Nation’s decisionmaking councils. 
There has never been a female President, nor a female member of 
this Court. Not a single woman presently sits in the United States 
Senate, and only 14 women hold seats in the House of Representa-
tives . . . . [T]his underrepresentation is present throughout all levels 
of our State and Federal Government.115 
Determining a group’s political powerlessness by the number of 
public representatives of that group in positions of power suffers from 
three problems. First, numbers are not an accurate measure of power. 
Second, courts do not employ a clear definition of underrepresentation or 
adequate representation. Third, this factor suggests that the level of scru-
tiny must be constantly reevaluated over time, a task that is not embraced 
by courts. 
First, underrepresentation is not necessarily an accurate proxy for 
political powerlessness. Measuring a group’s political power by the 
number of congressional representatives from that group grossly simpli-
fies the group’s ability to otherwise garner political attention (i.e., 
through coalition building or other tactics). After all, corporate CEOs are 
vastly underrepresented in Congress, yet no one would argue that corpo-
rate interests suffer from lack of representation.116 
                                                 
 114. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973). 
 115. Id. at 686 n.17. 
 116. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r, 957 A.2d 407, 501 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting). 
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Second, this test provides no real measure for determining underre-
presentation, except at the extremes. For example, three current Supreme 
Court Justices are women, but women constitute over 50% of the nation-
al population. Does this indicate that they are sufficiently represented or 
underrepresented? Instead of defining underrepresentation, courts use a 
sort of “gestalt” method of analysis, making a gut-level assessment of 
whether the group has the ability to attract the attention of lawmakers. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer typifies this approach when he wrote 
that it is “preposterous” to refer to gays as politically powerless, since 
even though they constitute only 4% of the population, they still have an 
“enormous influence in American media and politics.”117 Justice Scalia 
partially attributes this influence to a large disposable income (which is a 
clearly relevant factor for political power that is rarely discussed in equal 
protection case law).118 Justice Scalia’s approach here is disturbing. 
Courts invite bias when they “guesstimate” a group’s political power 
based on its percentage in the general population or its numbers in posi-
tions of authority.119 
Finally, this criterion suggests that the award of suspect status must 
be reconsidered and constantly reevaluated over time. Consider, for ex-
ample, the argument made in Frontiero that women are politically po-
werless. The statistics reflecting the underrepresentation of women have 
changed. As of 2011, there are eighty-eight women out of the 535 repre-
sentatives in Congress. There are sixty-nine women who hold statewide 
elective offices, 21% of the total available positions.120 A woman has run 
for—and come close to achieving—the Democratic nomination for Pres-
ident.121 Two women have been vice-presidential candidates for the ma-
jor parties in the last two decades.122 Does this mean women are no long-
er politically powerless? 
                                                 
 117. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 118. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 1541–42, Perry v. Schwarzenneger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW) (briefly discussing the effect of money on political power). 
 119. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 566. 
 120. Specifically, there are eighty-nine women in the House, and seventy women hold state-
wide elective office. CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS, RUTGERS UNIV., WOMEN IN ELECTIVE 
OFFICE (2011), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu. 
 121. See John Harwood, The Caucus, Democratic Primary Fight is Like No Other, Ever, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2008, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE7DA1339F931A35755 
C0A96E9C8B63&ref=hillaryrodhamclinton (discussing the close race between then-Senators Ba-
rack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton during the 2008 Democratic primary election). 
 122. In 1984, Representative Geraldine Ferraro was selected by Walter Mondale to be his vice-
presidential running mate on the Democratic ticket. See Kevin Rudin, Geraldine Ferraro Broke a 
Barrier for Women, but Roadblocks Remain, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Mar. 26, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2011/03/28/134882628/geraldine-ferraro-a-political-trailbla 
zer-for-women-is-dead. In 2008, Republican Senator John McCain selected Governor Sarah Palin to 
join his ticket as his vice-presidential running mate. Michael Cooper & Elisabeth Bumiller, Alaskan 
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This timing issue raises the question, once again, of whether courts 
should consider a group’s political powerlessness as of the date of the 
court challenge, or the date the law was passed. Should courts reevaluate 
the status provided to a group? Only one court has discussed the timing 
issue. The California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases held that 
state laws that restricted marriage to a man and a woman violated the 
California Constitution and, specifically, the state’s equal protection pro-
vision.123 With respect to political powerlessness, the Court stated the 
following: 
Although some California decisions in discussing suspect classifica-
tions have referred to a group’s “political powerlessness,” our cases 
have not identified a group’s current powerlessness as a necessary 
prerequisite for treatment as a suspect class. Indeed, if a group’s 
current political powerlessness were a prerequisite to a characteris-
tic’s being considered a constitutionally suspect basis for differen-
tial treatment, it would be impossible to justify the numerous deci-
sions that continue to treat sex, race, and religion as suspect classifi-
cations.124 
The timing issue will become especially pertinent if the Court continues 
to use political powerlessness as a factor in determining suspect class 
status.125 In the context of affirmative action, at least, the Court has indi-
cated that reassessment of an affirmative action plan is appropriate no 
later than twenty-five years after the Court sanctioned it.126 
4. Immutability 
The immutability of a group’s defining trait is frequently discussed 
by scholars, especially since the debate over whether the LGBT commu-
nity will become a suspect class has taken center stage. This factor raises 
                                                                                                             
is McCain’s Choice; First Woman on G.O.P. Ticket, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/us/politics/29palin.html?adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=
1313971780-PT1GjW45MNu+8NWdSH+ahg. 
 123. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008). Although the Court’s opinion dealt 
with California law on suspect classification, its analysis is equally germane to the factors under the 
Constitution. 
 124. Id. at 443 (internal citations omitted). The California Supreme Court in fact minimized 
both political powerlessness and immutability, suggesting that the most important factor in deciding 
suspect status is a group’s history of invidious and prejudicial treatment for a trait that is not relevant 
to the person’s ability to perform or contribute to society. 
 125. It may be that political powerlessness is not a relevant criteria at all, but that is a different 
question. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 16 (arguing that surely an invidious, racially discriminatory 
law would not lose its abhorrent quality simply because it was the product of a smoothly functioning 
democratic process). 
 126. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
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the same two questions as the others: how is it defined, and why is it re-
levant to the determination of suspectness? 
Courts have not provided a definitive, clear-cut definition of immu-
tability.127 Rather, they have employed several definitions over time. In-
itially, courts considered immutability something that a person is born 
with, a trait biologically determined, or as the Court phrased it in Fron-
tiero, a trait “determined solely by the accident of birth.”128 This defini-
tion has spurred lower courts’ vehement debate as to whether homosex-
uality is something one is born into.129 The Ninth Circuit in High Tech 
Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office rejected the immu-
tability of sexual orientation, noting that “homosexuality is not an im-
mutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally differ-
ent from [a] trait such as race.”130 
Some courts have modified the test of immutability, partially due to 
a realization that it may be difficult for courts to determine what is bio-
logically determined,131 and partially due to a belief that such a question 
is not an appropriate judicial inquiry. Instead, immutability depends on 
whether the trait is easily changed. A biologic trait may not be difficult to 
change. A person is born with a certain nose, for example, but can alter it 
with a simple surgery. Other advancements in surgery and medicine have 
even made it possible to alter one’s sex or certain physical disabilities.132 
This theory urges that immutability should depend on social constructs 
instead of biology and on how easily the trait is altered. A trait may be 
difficult to change because it is not within a person’s control, like illegi-
timacy,133 or because to change it would enact too great a cost to person-
hood. 
                                                 
 127. See Marc Shapiro, Treading the Supreme Court’s Murky Immutability Waters, 38 GONZ. 
L. REV. 409, 430 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to clearly define immutability). 
 128. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
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equal protection cases regarding homosexuals. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 
437 (S.D. Ohio 1994). 
 132. “The immutability requirement also finds itself in conflict with the factual reality that 
purportedly fixed traits, such as sex, are in fact more alterable and flexible than commonly pre-
sumed.” Goldberg, supra note 8, at 507. 
133 [I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our 
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegiti-
mate child is an ineffectual as well as an unjust way of deterring the parent. 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). 
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Determining whether the trait is too difficult to change is also an 
amorphous inquiry. For example, aliens are legally incapable of becom-
ing citizens for a certain period of years. And a child cannot change his 
or her age, although the age will change over time. Are aliens and child-
ren considered immutable under the “too difficult to change” criteria? 
The too difficult to change method of measuring immutability is 
gaining traction in both scholarly literature and judicial opinions, and is 
also supported by those in favor of awarding gays and lesbians some 
form of suspect status. Sexual orientation is immutable even if not bio-
logically determined, and even if a behavioral choice, because sexuality 
is a defining characteristic of personhood. Courts should consider sexual 
orientation immutable because it “would be abhorrent for government to 
penalize a person for refusing to change [it].”134 
Whichever definition of immutability is embraced, the question still 
remains: why does the immutability of a trait matter to equal protection 
analysis? Why is it relevant to determining suspectness? This criterion is 
different from the others because it is not germane to the question of 
whether the political process adequately protects a group. When consi-
dered separately from issues of historical discrimination or political po-
werlessness, there is no reason to believe that a legislature would think it 
fair to discriminate against someone for a trait that they cannot change 
without great cost. John Hart Ely thought not: “Surely one has to feel 
sorry for a person disabled by something that he or she can’t do anything 
about, but I’m not aware of any reason to suppose that elected officials 
are unusually unlikely to share that feeling.”135 
Thus, immutability seems to reflect a substantive concern rather 
than a procedural one. Rather than seeking to ensure a fair legislative 
process, it seeks to defend the very idea of equal protection, which is un-
dermined if legislators discriminate against a person based on some bio-
logical trait out of their control. As Professor Yoshino argues, “Treating 
people differently because of traits they cannot change violates funda-
mental norms of fairness and equality.”136 
If this is the correct definition of immutability, immutability alone 
should be enough to justify heightened scrutiny despite a group’s politi-
cal powerlessness or history of discrimination.137 Of course, no court has 
                                                 
 134. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990). 
 135. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980). 
 136. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 504. See also Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 
(D.C. 1995) (finding that immutability and relevance of a trait reflects a concern for stigma, and that 
the other factors relate more to the Carolene Products process concern). 
 137. This was indeed suggested by one case under Oregon law. Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. 
Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970 (Or. 1982) (finding immutable characteristics sufficient for defining a 
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ever applied immutability that way. Height, eye color, intelligence, and 
some physical and mental disabilities are reasonably considered immuta-
ble, but no court has awarded a group suspect status based on those traits 
alone.138 
Instead, many courts merge the concern about immutability with 
the “relevancy” criterion. For example, the Supreme Court in Mathews v. 
Lucas, when considering the legal status of illegitimacy, held that 
illegitimacy . . . is, like race or national origin, a characteristic de-
termined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate indi-
vidual, and it bears no relation to the individual’s ability to partici-
pate in and contribute to society.139 
An immutable, irrelevant trait is unfair; a relevant immutable one is 
not.140 
Other courts seem to reject the substantive definition of immutabili-
ty and instead adopt a procedural one. These courts equate immutability 
with the discreteness of a group and ask whether the characteristic is vis-
ible, distinguishing, or obvious.141 For example, the Court in Frontiero 
concluded that “it can hardly be doubted that, in part, because of the high 
visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at 
times more subtle, discrimination.”142 Courts that embrace this concept 
of immutability believe that 
distinct groups are politically powerless because, inter alia, they 
cannot evade discrimination. When confronted with discrimination, 
an indistinct group may temporarily or permanently escape by 
changing or hiding its defining trait. Distinct groups do not have 
this chameleon like ability and thus are subject to the full force of 
discrimination.143 
                                                                                                             
suspect class under Article I, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution); but see Tanner v. Or. Health 
Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that immutability is not necessary to 
establish a suspect class). 
 138. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2443 (arguing that immutability under this definition is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for heightened scrutiny). 
 139. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 518 (1976) (finding that the history of discrimination 
experienced by illegitimate children was less severe than that suffered by women or blacks “perhaps 
in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge”). 
 140. As Professor Halley wrote, “The Court tentatively suggested in Frontiero that immutabili-
ty is a factor that intensifies the invidiousness of government-imposed burdens unrelated to the job at 
hand.” Halley, supra note 129, at 509. 
 141. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (lumping immutability with obvious, 
distinguishing characteristics); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976). 
 142. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
 143. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 507–08. 
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Under this definition then, immutability is more consistent with the 
other factors: an immutable trait that is highly visible makes it more like-
ly that the group is or remains politically powerless or subject to a histo-
ry of discrimination. 
The point of this Article is not to suggest what definition of immu-
tability should prevail but instead to urge further discussion. Immutabili-
ty suffers from the same flaws as the other factors—it is imprecisely and 
inconsistently defined by the courts. 
5. Relevancy 
Courts also consider the relevancy of a group’s defining characte-
ristic or whether the trait bears a relation to the individual’s ability to 
participate and contribute to society.144 This factor was part of the 
Court’s justification for finding that women warranted quasi-suspect sta-
tus in Frontiero.145 It was also the preeminent factor considered by the 
Court in Cleburne146 and considered by lower courts.147 If a trait does not 
reflect a person’s abilities, it is presumptively irrelevant, and the law il-
legitimately discriminates on the basis of it.148 Relevancy helps deter-
mine whether the political process protects a group, or whether a legisla-
tive determination about a group is infected by bias or stereotype. Since 
overt evidence of bias is difficult to ascertain, the Court uses relevance as 
a proxy: if the group characteristic is rarely relevant to a legitimate legis-
lative objective, then strict scrutiny may be appropriate. Intermediate 
scrutiny is appropriate where it is sometimes relevant, and rational basis 
review is appropriate where the trait is often relevant.149 
Courts frequently rely on relevancy as a proxy for the trustworthi-
ness of the political process.150 Relevancy was the determinative factor in 
creating two nonsuspect classifications: mental disability and age. Al-
                                                 
 144. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 537. 
 145. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
 146. The factor received starting-line-up status in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 
473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985). In Cleburne, the Court held that “any form of heightened scrutiny is inap-
propriate for classifications that reasonable legislators could conscientiously use for legitimate pur-
poses.” Ellis, supra note 102, at 376–77. 
 147. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) (finding that rational basis 
is appropriate where “individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics 
relevant to interests the state has the authority to implement”). 
 148. Oh, supra note 48, at 591. Professor Simon suggests another possible purpose of looking 
at the relevancy of a particular trait—that it is a way to make a moral judgment as to whether the 
classification is desirable. For example, he argues that it would be equally irrelevant to prevent 
blacks and plumbers from being denied a state benefit, like in-state tuition, but there is something 
worse about denying the benefit to blacks than to plumbers. Id. 
 149. Aukerman, supra note 19, at 57. 
 150. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 23 (describing relevancy as an “essential” element along with 
history of discrimination). 
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though in both cases the Court discussed the other criteria for determin-
ing a suspect class, its finding that the trait was relevant was clearly sig-
nificant. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court held that age 
classifications deserved only rational basis review because “unlike gov-
ernment conduct based on race or gender, [age] cannot be characterized 
as ‘so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest 
that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice 
and antipathy.’”151 Similarly, in Cleburne, the Court found that although 
the mentally disabled “have a reduced ability to cope with and function 
in the everyday world . . . [they are different, immutably so, in relevant 
respects] and the State’s interest in dealing and providing for them is 
plainly a legitimate one.”152 Despite determining that the mentally dis-
abled are entitled to only rational basis review, the Court found that a law 
requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home rested 
on irrational prejudice against the mentally disabled and thus violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.153 
Relevancy suffers from the same problems as the other factors: 
there are inherent ambiguities that make it a less reliable indicator of leg-
islative bias. First, it is not clear how to determine the relevance of a 
trait.  Should the trait be relevant in some broad, abstract sense or merely 
relevant for the purposes of the statute under review? For example, being 
a sex offender may be a very relevant factor in a hiring decision for a 
public school but less relevant for deciding who has access to mass 
transportation. Being mentally disabled may be highly relevant for an 
airline pilot but not relevant at all for determining who may live in a 
flood zone. Being nearsighted is certainly relevant for hiring a pilot and 
irrelevant for hiring a law professor.154 As Thurgood Marshall once re-
marked, 
[T]hat a characteristic may be relevant under some or even many 
circumstances does not suggest any reason to presume it relevant 
under other circumstances where there is reason to suspect it is not. 
A sign that says “men only” looks very different on a bathroom 
door than a courthouse door.155 
The point that relevancy is context-specific suggests a broader me-
thodological question: can a group be suspect in one situation and not in 
                                                 
 151. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440). 
 152. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. 
 153. Id. at 432. 
 154. Halley, supra note 129, at 508. 
 155. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 468–69 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in 
part). 
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others? Such a possibility was raised by Judge Smith of the New York 
Court of Appeals: 
Perhaps that principle [of considering whether the trait is relevant to 
state interests in legislating] would lead us to apply heightened scru-
tiny to sexual preference discrimination in some cases, but not 
where we review legislation governing marriage and family rela-
tionships. A person’s preference for the sort of sexual activity that 
cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to the state’s interest 
in fostering relationships that will serve children best. In this area, 
therefore, we conclude that rational basis scrutiny is appropriate.156 
Whether courts should do this, of course, is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle. Rather, the point is more basic: courts have not adequately defined 
relevancy and are inconsistent in how they accord it weight. In some cas-
es, the Court has insisted on rational basis review for traits considered 
relevant to a group’s ability to contribute to society.157 Other times, how-
ever, it has awarded suspect or quasi-suspect status to groups whose cha-
racteristics are relevant to legislative goals.158 
A final critique is whether relevancy should be considered at all. 
Why is relevancy an appropriate inquiry when determining whether a 
law violates the Equal Protection Clause? One answer may be that the 
relevancy of a trait helps to determine when the legislative process ade-
quately protects a group. But it is unclear whether relevancy is truly an 
effective proxy for legislative bias. The inclusion of an irrelevant trait in 
a statute may be strong evidence of bias, but the opposite is not always 
true. Classification based on a relevant trait is not indicative of a lack of 
prejudice. A mental disability, for example, may be both a relevant factor 
and one used in a discriminatory manner. 
Another answer may be that relevancy of a trait is not related pri-
marily to a procedural concern about the political process but instead 
pertains to a substantive concern about fairness. It may be fundamentally 
unfair to classify people based on irrelevant traits, especially if they are 
immutable. This idea raises the deeper question of precisely what courts 
are trying to accomplish through the equal protection criteria. 
                                                 
 156. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006). 
 157. See id. (finding that rational basis scrutiny is appropriate “where individuals in the group 
affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority 
to implement”) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441). 
 158. See Aukerman, supra note 19, at 57. The issue of how to weigh this factor is not limited to 
the “relevant trait” inquiry. It pertains to every factor and accordingly is further discussed in Part 
III.B. 
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B. The Factors in Relation to Each Other 
The Court has never described how the factors exist in relation to 
each other, explained which factors are to be given priority, or clarified 
how much weight to assign any particular factor. The Supreme Court 
once suggested that meeting even one factor is sufficient to award a 
group suspect status, finding that a suspect class entitled to strict judicial 
scrutiny is one “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of 
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process.”159 Yet, no court has ever found that a 
group is awarded suspect status by its political powerlessness alone, for 
example. The same is true for the other factors. As Professor Hutchinson 
wrote, 
Although all of these factors [discussed above] have appeared in 
cases discussing the standards for heightened scrutiny, 
courts . . . have often disregarded one or all of them in their analy-
sis. In addition, the presence of these (or most of these) factors has 
not necessarily resulted in the application of heightened scrutiny.160 
Without more guidance, courts are left performing a mushy, gestalt-
type analysis. Presumably, the more factors satisfied the merrier. Beyond 
that, it is unclear how the factors interplay. What happens if a group has 
an extensive history of discrimination but is politically powerful? What 
about a group with a moderate discrimination history that is not com-
pletely powerless but also is not powerful, and its defining characteristic 
is not immutable? The combinations are almost endless. When these 
questions remain unanswered, equal protection analysis leads to unprin-
cipled results. 
C. A Rejection of the Criteria: The Problem of Symmetry 
Determining what groups are entitled to suspect classification is al-
so confusing because there is no set hierarchy or weight applied to the 
factors, and sometimes factors are inexplicably ignored. I refer here to 
the problem of “symmetry.” Under the doctrine of symmetry, African-
Americans receive strict scrutiny but so do whites. Women receive in-
termediate scrutiny but so do men. Courts consider not the particular dis-
criminated classes but rather a group’s general classification. One scho-
lar described the phenomenon this way: 
                                                 
 159. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (emphasis added). 
 160. Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 635 (internal citations omitted). 
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[O]nce a subordinate class successfully establishes that the discrim-
ination it faces warrants exacting judicial scrutiny, the Court applies 
heightened scrutiny symmetrically and extends judicial solicitude to 
any individual who encounters discrimination based on the ‘same’ 
trait as the members of the subordinate class . . . . Thus, while 
blacks or women might constitute suspect classes due to their so-
cially disadvantaged statuses, whites and men receive heightened 
scrutiny when they challenge laws that classify on the basis of race 
of gender.161 
Symmetrical treatment of race or gender could be justified based on 
the factors discussed in Part III.A. In other words, laws that discriminate 
against men also treat women differently, and it is this treatment of 
women that violates the Equal Protection Clause. In Craig v. Boren, the 
first case that established intermediate scrutiny for gender, males could 
not drink 3.2% beer until they were twenty-one, but females could drink 
at eighteen.162 Eighteen-year-old males have not been historically discri-
minated against, and clearly, they are not politically powerless. Indeed, 
immutability is the only factor that males could claim in their favor. 
But the law in Craig could also be characterized as discriminatory 
against women. The law was ultimately based on stereotypes that women 
are more responsible and less likely to drink and drive. Perhaps even 
“positive” stereotypes should not be the basis of legislative judgments. 
Similarly, it could be argued that laws that discriminate against whites 
harm African-Americans as well: this is a common argument in the con-
text of affirmative action.163 
Yet, whether a court applies strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny 
does not really turn on ascertaining the “real” group that is harmed by the 
law. None of the Justices in Craig v. Boren suggested that heightened 
scrutiny was being applied because the law discriminated against wom-
en. And not all laws that discriminate against whites also harm African-
Americans, but strict scrutiny is applied to both groups. For example, a 
state-sponsored play on Martin Luther King, Jr. that advertised for only 
black actors to play the lead role would receive strict scrutiny even 
though only whites were excluded, and the advertisement did not stig-
matize African-Americans. The Court has declared that any facial classi-
                                                 
 161. Id. at 638–39. 
 162. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 163. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because 
those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because 
every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provi-
sion of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”). 
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fication based on race justifies the highest level of scrutiny, the factors so 
carefully laid out in prior equal protection cases be damned.164 
In analyzing suspect classes symmetrically, the Court adds another 
inconsistency to its equal protection analysis and makes many of the fac-
tors irrelevant.165 Historical discrimination, political powerlessness, and 
discrete and insular minority status are not considered in a symmetrical 
approach.166 
The Court adds further confusion to the criteria by switching back 
and forth between concern about suspect classes (i.e., African-
Americans) and suspect classifications (i.e., race in general). The sym-
metrical approach indicates that the Court recognizes some factors in 
some situations but will ignore most of those factors in other situa-
tions.167 For example, when determining whether the LGBT community 
should receive suspect class status, the Court focuses on factors like his-
tory of discrimination, political powerlessness, and immutability. But for 
racial groups, the same factors are essentially irrelevant. One may won-
der if these factors are truly important if they are sometimes cavalierly 
disregarded by the Court. 
IV. HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT THE FACTORS AS APPLIED TO 
SUSPECT CLASSES (OR CLASSIFICATIONS)? FRAMING THE DEBATE 
The Court has not produced a new suspect class applying the exist-
ing criteria since 1973,168 although many believe that certain groups like 
the LGBT community, the poor, and the disabled deserve heightened 
scrutiny.169 Perhaps this indicates that the current factors are at fault and 
should be reconsidered or more precisely defined by the courts. Or per-
haps it shows that the current criteria is perfectly fine but has been sub-
verted by conservative judges. A close analysis of the factors only leads 
to more questions. 
                                                 
 164. The Court has clearly embraced a classification-based approach as opposed to a class-
based one. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 489. 
 165. The switch to symmetry classification has “basically rendered suspect class analysis irre-
levant.” Oh, supra note 48, at 601. 
 166. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 563. 
 167. Oh, supra note 48, at 601. 
 168. See Emily K. Baxter, Rationalizing Away Political Powerlessness: Equal Protection 
Analysis of Laws Classifying Gays and Lesbians, 72 MO. L. REV. 891, 894 (2007). 
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that a law discriminating against gays and lesbians violated the Equal Protection Clause); Cleburne 
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In this Part, I pose some overarching thoughts that should guide the 
discussion. Before deciding how to approach an equal protection ma-
keover, the following issues should be considered. 
A. Is Suspect Class Status a Scarce Resource? 
One issue is whether suspect status should remain rare. Many be-
lieve the Court has developed the current criteria as a gatekeeper to en-
sure the judiciary does not recognize too many suspect classes and to 
ensure that suspect status is granted only in extraordinary circumstances. 
This fear is illustrated by Justice Rehnquist’s comments warning that 
almost any group could “package” itself as a discrete and insular minori-
ty170 and by the Court in Cleburne, which expressed the need for caution 
in defining a group as suspect.171 
Three arguments support the view that suspect status should only be 
stringently granted: First, awarding suspect status to more groups may 
dilute its meaning. For example, classifying the mentally disabled as sus-
pect may denigrate the prejudice and discrimination experienced by 
African-Americans. Second, the requirements of strict scrutiny might be 
watered down or less rigorously applied if more groups qualified for its 
protection. Third, the proper role of the courts in our constitutional sys-
tem mandates that heightened scrutiny be utilized only rarely because 
courts must defer to legislative judgment, not constantly scrutinize its 
objectives and means. 
None of these arguments seem particularly persuasive. The first ar-
gument, that awarding suspect status to other groups may dilute the his-
tory of discrimination experienced by African-Americans, is moot: the 
Court considers all races, not just African-American, suspect. Moreover, 
more is not necessarily less. Awarding suspect status to one group is un-
related to another group’s egregious history of discrimination or political 
powerlessness. Other countries classify many groups as suspect without 
minimizing the victimhood of any one group. For example, the South 
African Constitution prohibits discrimination equally with respect to nu-
merous groups: “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indi-
rectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orien-
tation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth.”172 State constitutions and statutes also often protect a broader ar-
ray of groups without detriment to one specific group. 
                                                 
 170. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 171. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441–42. 
 172. S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
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The second argument, that if the Court awards suspect status more 
liberally it will begin applying a watered-down version of strict scrutiny, 
is a legitimate but not significant concern. Strict scrutiny is well-
established: a law will be upheld only if the government proves a com-
pelling interest for the law and proves that the means for achieving that 
interest are narrowly tailored. Considering that the government bears the 
burden to demonstrate a compelling interest and to justify its means, and 
given that the current strict scrutiny analysis has been used for over fifty 
years, a court could not easily subvert this test. 
The final argument that heightened scrutiny analysis should be ap-
plied sparingly since it involves an intrusive judicial intervention with 
the legislative process merely counsels caution not abdication by the 
Court. Critics argue that the more groups that are awarded suspect status, 
the more times a court will overturn a legislative decision, which sub-
verts its judicial role as a restrained and deferential body. But for groups 
not adequately protected by the political process, judicial intervention is 
justified and necessary. As Professor Yoshino stated, 
[T]he fact that many groups are deserving of the courts’ protection 
is not, in itself, a principled reason for excluding any of them. It can 
also be criticized as leading to a “first in time is first in right” juri-
sprudence, which privileges groups that made their claims before 
the judiciary imposed an arbitrary cutoff.173 
But the Court seems to believe that such a limitation is necessary.174 
Many attribute the Court’s refusal in Cleburne to award suspect status to 
the mentally disabled to a fear of opening the suspect-class floodgates. 
There, the Court stated the following: 
If the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were 
deemed quasi-suspect . . . it would be difficult to find a principled 
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps im-
mutable disabilities setting them off from others who cannot them-
selves mandate the desired legislative responses and who can claim 
some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. 
One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the 
mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that 
course and we decline to do so.175 
                                                 
 173. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 562. 
 174. Id. at 552 (arguing that the criteria serve as a “gate-keeping function” to limit the number 
of suspect classes). The Court is unlikely to accept a different solution without an alternative means 
of limiting the number of protected groups. Id. 
 175. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445–46. 
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Thus, justified or not, part of the reevaluation of equal protection analy-
sis is whether suspect class status should be uncommon. 
B. What is the Purpose of the Factors? Rethinking the  
Equal Protection Doctrine 
Ultimately, a reevaluation of the criteria should address the broader 
question of whether the Equal Protection Clause seeks to achieve a pro-
cedural objective (to compensate for an inadequate or untrustworthy po-
litical process), a substantive one (to prevent groups from being treated 
differently for an immutable trait)176 or both. For the former, history of 
discrimination and political power are crucial, and creating a consistent 
and workable meaning for those factors is essential. For the latter, history 
of discrimination and political power are less important or even irrele-
vant, but immutability and relevancy take center stage. 
Additionally, this discussion should begin to include the true nature 
of the group at issue. For example, scholars have recently debated what 
“race” really means, whether African-American women should be 
treated differently than African-American men or women of other races, 
and the interplay of overlapping characteristics like race and poverty.177 
The ambiguities and nuances of equal protection jurisprudence may 
ultimately require the Court to reconsider the validity of the three-tier 
analysis of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Scho-
lars178 and judges179 are already questioning this scheme. Some argue that 
the ideals of equal protection are more likely protected by a balancing 
test180 or by a single standard181 or continuum approach that does not at-
tempt to fit the factors within clearly circumscribed slots. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Like the famous Carolene Products Footnote 4, this Article raises 
more questions than it answers. Despite the fact that equal protection 
jurisprudence appears to be a settled area of constitutional law, the fac-
                                                 
 176. See Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 616 (arguing that the meaning of the Equal Protection 
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tors used in its analysis are ambiguous and inconsistent. This Article has 
sought to better frame the equal protection analysis debate by compre-
hensively describing these factors. Such a debate is critical to ensure that 
our government treats its citizens equally as guaranteed by the Equal 
Protection Clause. An amorphous test risks unprincipled results and 
thwarts equality under the law. 
